Chapter 4: Transport of Radioactive Material

Transport links the generation, processing, storage and disposal of radioactive waste, and in the course of it custody passes from one responsible party to another. Safe transport depends on suitable packaging, characterization of the contents, radiation protection and appropriate security measures. Where applicable, criticality safety must also be ensured. WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 defines the waste package identification, radiological data, container information, chain of custody (hand-over and acceptance records), monitoring data and transport approval metadata that support this work. Whether a shipment is authorized and whether a package qualifies are determined by the applicable approvals and the evidence that supports them.

WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 lays the groundwork for waste classification in PHASE-1, Foundation & Classification, and defines the structure and interfaces of the waste package in §4 (Data Model) and §10 (API Interface) of the standard. This chapter connects those records to package selection, transport security, movement monitoring, chain of custody and acceptance by the receiving facility. It uses the principles of transport engineering to explain the physical safety functions, and the implementation recommendations to show how the evidence behind operational decisions can be preserved in records.

4.1 Transport Package Types and Their Safety Functions

IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, sets out the transport safety framework applied in this chapter. The 2018 Edition, SSR-6 (Rev. 1), has been superseded by the 2025 Edition, SSR-6 (Rev. 2); an actual shipment is therefore governed by the edition adopted by the State concerned. The package types, test conditions and approval arrangements discussed in this chapter are common to both editions. Packaging consists of the components that perform safety functions, such as the receptacle, shielding and shock-absorbing material. A transport package is the packaging together with its radioactive contents as prepared for transport. Package selection takes into account the contents, activity, physical form, fissile properties, mode of transport and applicable approval conditions.

Waste management classes such as low level waste and high level waste are applied separately from package types. The same packaging may or may not be suitable depending on the contents, physical form, activity and thermal output. Selecting a package type therefore requires an assessment of the actual contents and loading configuration, in addition to the waste management class.

Whether a package qualifies as an excepted package is a matter of transport requirements. Exemption and clearance, which remove waste from radiation regulatory control, are judged against separate criteria. Shipment by post must satisfy both the conditions for postal transport in the transport regulations and the acceptance conditions of the postal authorities.

Under SSR-6, Type B(U) and Type C package designs require unilateral approval, and Type B(M) package designs require multilateral approval. However, Type B(U) and Type C designs for fissile material and Type B(U) designs for low dispersible radioactive material require multilateral approval (SSR-6 (Rev. 1), para. 808). Recognition of approvals and any additional shipment procedures depend on the States involved, the mode of transport, the contents and the conditions of transport. The extent to which a given package design may be used is defined by its approved contents and loading conditions.

A qualification programme follows the applicable test sequence, conditions and acceptance criteria. In the normal-condition tests for Type A packages, the water spray test is performed before each of the free drop, stacking and penetration tests. The assessment of Type B packages includes the applicable drop, penetration, thermal and immersion conditions. Requirements for fissile material apply separately from the activity-based distinction between package types.

4.2 A1 and A2 Activity Limits

Activity is the number of radioactive decays per unit time and is expressed in becquerels; 1 Bq corresponds to one decay per second. A1 is the radionuclide-specific activity limit for special form radioactive material in a Type A package. A2 applies to radioactive material other than special form. Special form is a regulatory designation given to a qualifying non-dispersible solid material or to a sealed capsule containing radioactive material, and its qualification must be supported by the required demonstration evidence.

In the 2025 Edition, SSR-6 (Rev. 2), the Co-60 values are unchanged, but the A2 value for Cs-137 becomes 0.5 TBq and the A1 value for Pu-239 becomes 40 TBq. Calculations should therefore use the table values of the edition being applied, and the record should state which edition was used.

For a mixture of known composition in which every constituent is in other than special form, compliance with the activity limit can be calculated as follows.

sum_i (a_i / A2_i) <= 1

Here a_i is the activity of radionuclide i and A2_i is the A2 value applicable to that radionuclide. The numerator and denominator must be in the same unit of activity. The calculation requires the inventory of every radionuclide and an appropriate common reference time. Where special form and non-special-form constituents are both present, the formula in para. 430 of SSR-6 applies: sum_i (B_i / A1_i) + sum_j (C_j / A2_j) <= 1, where B_i is the activity of a special form constituent and C_j is the activity of a constituent in other than special form. The values used in the calculation are determined by the radionuclide tables and associated rules of the applicable edition. If the composition or physical form is uncertain, further characterization must be carried out before the assessment is completed.

As an example, a hypothetical mixture in which every constituent is in other than special form and which contains 0.10 TBq of Co-60 and 0.30 TBq of Cs-137 is calculated as follows.

(0.10 / 0.40) + (0.30 / 0.60) = 0.75

The result for this hypothetical example is not greater than 1, so the mixture meets the activity limit. Using the 2025 Edition A2 value for Cs-137 of 0.5 TBq gives (0.10 / 0.40) + (0.30 / 0.50) = 0.85, which also meets the limit. A sum of exactly 1 also meets the limit. Meeting all the requirements for a Type A package further requires assessment of package performance, radiation levels, surface contamination, thermal output, the provisions for fissile material, marking, transport documents and any other applicable requirements.

4.2.1 Activity Reference Times and Measurement Records

WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 defines radionuclide-specific activity records in radiologicalData.isotopes, the reference date for total activity in radiologicalData.totalActivity.referenceDate, and uncertainty information in radiologicalData.uncertainties. These fields are used to prepare calculation inputs. The time a record is created and the activity reference time have different meanings. Keeping the two apart is particularly important when radioactive decay changes the inventory significantly between characterization and dispatch.

Activity and dose rate are different physical quantities. For the same activity, the dose rate varies with the type and energy of the radiation, the shielding and the measurement position. The radiologicalData.doseRate.contact and radiologicalData.doseRate.oneMeter fields preserve values measured at different positions. Comparing values requires consistent units and knowledge of the measurement conditions and uncertainty. When projecting inventory, the decay of a single radionuclide must also be distinguished from systems in which the decay of a parent radionuclide produces radioactive daughter radionuclides.

4.3 Fissile Material and Criticality Safety

The transport of fissile material requires an assessment demonstrating that subcriticality is maintained in the configurations and under the conditions specified in the applicable transport requirements. The assessment covers individual packages and the relevant arrays of packages under the prescribed normal and accident conditions. Criticality safety assessment is separate from the activity limit calculation and evaluates the potential for a self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction.

The effective neutron multiplication factor, k_eff, indicates whether the neutron population is decreasing, steady or increasing. A value below 1 corresponds to a subcritical state. For the results of an assessment to be accepted, a validated method must be used, calculational bias and uncertainty must be taken into account, and an appropriate subcritical margin must be maintained. WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 does not define numerical acceptance limits or statistical confidence criteria that apply universally to transport criticality safety assessments.

KENO-VI is a Monte Carlo criticality code included in the SCALE system of Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Applying it to a package assessment requires validation appropriate to the contents and configurations being assessed. The calculated results must be reviewed, and their applicability to the planned loading must be confirmed.

4.3.1 Spent Fuel Records and Burnup Credit

Burnup credit takes account of changes in fuel composition resulting from irradiation, where the relevant criticality safety assessment allows it. These changes include both the depletion and the production of nuclides. Applying burnup credit requires the relevant fuel history and confirmation that the assessment method covers the conditions to which it is applied. The recorded average burnup is therefore only part of the supporting evidence.

WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 preserves the relevant history of spent nuclear fuel through the traceability fields traceability.fuelAssemblyId, traceability.burnup, traceability.dischargeDate and traceability.coolingTime. In implementing a system, it is advisable to link these records to the loading lists, assessments and approvals that support the actual contents and container configuration, and to manage those links.

4.4 Transport Security and Access to Information

Transport safety is concerned with protecting people and the environment from the radiation hazards that arise during transport, such as exposure, release of contents and the consequences of accidents. Transport security addresses unauthorized removal, unauthorized access and malicious acts. IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 9-G (Rev. 1), Security of Radioactive Material in Transport, provides guidance on transport security. The security framework for the transport of radioactive material in that guidance and the categorization of nuclear material into Categories I, II and III for physical protection serve different purposes.

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5, 2011) categorizes nuclear material by element, isotope, quantity and irradiation status. Uranium is categorized by enrichment band and quantity of U-235, while irradiated fuel (spent nuclear fuel) is categorized on a separate basis. These security categories are also distinct from the Type A, Type B and Type C package designations.

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 25-G, Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities, addresses nuclear material accountancy and control for facility security. The transport criticality safety assessment, the package approval and the security plan each have their own purpose and supporting evidence.

Specific protective measures are determined by the relevant security assessment, regulations and approved security arrangements. Decisions on escorts, satellite or GPS tracking, communications and staffing, including whether two drivers are needed, also follow these arrangements.

In the WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 waste package model, safety.riskLevel indicates the safety risk level of the waste package. The transport security category is addressed by the relevant security assessment. In implementing a system, it is advisable to restrict access to detailed routes, movement information and security plans to users with a business need. At the same time, responsible parties should be able to use the waste package identification and the chain of custody information they need.

Information security protects the transport records used by these parties. Access rights should specify the waste packages, facilities and records that each role requires. Authentication verifies the identity of a system user, and authorization determines what information that user may access and what operations the user may perform. These controls complement physical protection measures and the safety functions of the package.

4.5 Planning, Monitoring and Recording Transfers

Movement plans and records of actual movements serve different purposes. A plan describes the intended origin, destination, mode of transport, responsibilities and relevant conditions. A record of actual movement shows what happened and when, and who reported it or took custody. Keeping the meanings of the two records distinct makes it possible to tell an expected arrival from a completed hand-over and acceptance.

Route planning considers the mass of the package and conveyance, handling conditions, transshipment points, interim storage, weather, access to the receiving facility and contingency arrangements for transport disruptions. When an alternative route is used, the approvals and conditions applicable to that route must be reviewed. Location tracking and communication systems can support the movement plan in accordance with the operating arrangements defined for the shipment in question.

A location observation should be preserved together with its observation time, source, validity and the time of the last communication. Because the last confirmed coordinates may continue to be displayed after communication is lost, the time elapsed since the observation and the communication status are essential to interpreting a location. Where communications are made redundant, common power supplies or communication paths that could affect several channels at once should still be considered.

In a system that monitors the permitted extent of a transport route, a route deviation alert should prompt a check of location uncertainty, data latency and whether an approved route change exists. The movement plan should designate who is responsible for verifying observations and notifying the parties concerned. An alert is an observation that requires evaluation, and continuous monitoring and operational checks are needed throughout the shipment.

WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 records facility coordinates and the storage location of waste packages. The PUT /packages/{packageId}/location operation updates a StorageLocation. A system that integrates vehicle or vessel tracking should document how observations are linked to waste package identifiers and storage records. Radiation measurements should likewise carry enough context to distinguish measurements taken before departure, during transport and after receipt.

An incident record can preserve the identifiers of the affected waste packages and containers, the observation time, the relevant measurements and their units, the person responsible and the actions taken. The safety.emergencyContacts and safety.emergencyProcedure fields of WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 link a waste package record to the relevant emergency contacts and emergency procedures.

4.6 Linking Transport Evidence to the Waste Package Model

WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 defines identifiers that distinguish the managed waste package from the physical container that holds it. Chain of custody information and regulatory information each preserve the evidence suited to their purpose. Used together, these fields allow the same item to be identified consistently before dispatch, during transport and after receipt.

WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 uses different sets of classification codes in the classification scheme of the main text of the standard and in PHASE-1. The layers of the codes are set out in the code layer table in Section 1.3, and the relationship between the spent nuclear fuel codes (HLW-1 and HLW-SF) is explained in the Standard Reading Notes, item 3, in Section 1.3. What matters for transport records is that wasteClass does not determine the package type. A system should preserve the classification scheme to which each code belongs and, where an agreed mapping between schemes exists, document it clearly.

The same waste package structure offers Type_B, IP-2, IP-3 and spent_fuel_cask as values of containerInfo.containerType. These values indicate the container type in the WIA record. How a given container relates to the package types and approval arrangements discussed in Section 4.1 of this chapter is confirmed through the relevant design and approval documents.

Package design approval, fabrication and inspection records for the actual packaging, and the approvals needed for an individual shipment are different kinds of evidence. In implementing a system, it is advisable to link the waste package record to the relevant controlled documents and to the assessment of their applicability. In addition to the approval number and expiry date, the approval conditions on contents, configuration and use should be reviewed. The measurements, alarm thresholds and certificate identifiers in the example records serve to illustrate the data structure; an actual consignment requires evidence for that consignment.

4.6.1 Responsibilities at Dispatch, During Carriage and at Receipt

The following operational role model can be used to organize transport records systematically. Legal responsibilities and approval authority depend on the applicable legislation and conditions of transport.

1. Consignor: Checks the contents, waste package and container identifiers, measurements, applicable approvals and receipt conditions against one another for consistency, and preserves the basis for judging that the shipment is ready for dispatch.
2. Carrier: Confirms the identification and condition of the packages it takes into custody, records changes of custody and abnormal conditions during transport, and passes on enough information for the next responsible party to identify the same packages.
3. Consignee: Checks arriving packages against the expected receipt record and evaluates them against the facility's acceptance criteria, recording arrival and the final acceptance decision as separate events.

The facility object records facility information, and traceability.chainOfCustody records chain of custody events. The system's evidential records should clearly state the legal roles of the consignor, carrier and consignee and the authority of the persons acting on their behalf. The responsible field indicates the party responsible for an event; identity, qualifications and authority must each be supported by their own evidence.

4.7 Example Waste Package Record for a Transfer

The following example shows part of a record that uses the field names and nested structure defined by WIA-ENE-026 v1.0. All identifiers, dates, locations, event labels, descriptions of responsible parties and approval details in the scenario are fictitious. The example shows how transport-related information is captured in a waste package record. A complete RadioactiveWastePackage request must also include the remaining required information, and compliance with transport requirements must be demonstrated by the evidence for the shipment concerned.

{
  "packageId": "RW-2026-KR-00000002",
  "timestamp": "2026-02-01T16:00:00Z",
  "wasteClass": "HLW-1",
  "containerInfo": {
    "containerId": "EXAMPLE-CONTAINER-001",
    "containerType": "Type_B"
  },
  "traceability": {
    "chainOfCustody": [
      {
        "timestamp": "2026-02-01T08:00:00Z",
        "event": "dispatch_recorded",
        "location": "Example consignor facility",
        "responsible": "Example dispatch officer"
      },
      {
        "timestamp": "2026-02-01T16:00:00Z",
        "event": "receipt_recorded",
        "location": "Example receiving facility",
        "responsible": "Example receiving officer"
      }
    ]
  },
  "regulatory": {
    "transportApproval": {
      "approvalNumber": "EXAMPLE-APPROVAL-001",
      "validUntil": "2026-12-31",
      "authority": "Example approving authority"
    }
  }
}

packageId identifies the managed waste package, and containerInfo.containerId identifies its container. Chain of custody entries describe reported events, and the approval object stores separate regulatory metadata. The event strings dispatch_recorded and receipt_recorded are examples of labels used in an implementation. The responsible field contains text identifying the responsible party. Evidence of authenticated identity and digital signatures should be included in the records that support the hand-over and acceptance.

This example focuses on the identification, chain of custody and approval metadata within the full record. Registration and transport review also draw on the radionuclide inventory, physical properties, monitoring information and other waste package data relevant to the contents and the planned movement.

4.7.1 Example Transfer into Dry Storage

The second example shows part of a waste package record after transfer into the dry storage area of a receiving facility. All identifiers, facility descriptions, responsible parties, approval details and dates are fictitious. The example uses HLW-1, spent_fuel_cask and dry_storage from the WIA waste package structure. Detailed dimensions, radiological characteristics and inspection evidence are managed as part of the full waste package record used for operational review.

{
  "packageId": "RW-2026-KR-00000003",
  "timestamp": "2026-01-15T09:00:00Z",
  "wasteClass": "HLW-1",
  "containerInfo": {
    "containerId": "EXAMPLE-CONT-0001",
    "containerType": "spent_fuel_cask"
  },
  "storage": {
    "storageLocation": {
      "facilityId": "EXAMPLE-FAC-0002",
      "facilityName": "Example receiving facility",
      "building": "Example dry storage building",
      "row": "A",
      "column": "1",
      "level": "1"
    },
    "storageType": "dry_storage"
  },
  "traceability": {
    "chainOfCustody": [
      {
        "timestamp": "2026-01-15T09:00:00Z",
        "event": "transferred_to_dry_storage",
        "location": "Dry storage area, example receiving facility",
        "responsible": "Example receiving officer"
      }
    ]
  },
  "regulatory": {
    "transportApproval": {
      "approvalNumber": "EXAMPLE-APPROVAL-0001",
      "validUntil": "2026-12-31",
      "authority": "Example approving authority"
    }
  }
}

WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 uses the string transferred_to_dry_storage as an example of a chain of custody event. Systems that exchange additional events must agree clearly on their meaning and on the rules of exchange. Chain of custody event labels describe the history of a waste package, whereas webhook event names identify notifications between systems.

4.8 Chain of Custody Records, Audit Logs and Digital Integrity

Chain of custody entries record events concerning a waste package. The API audit log records activity within the information system. A location update records a storage location or location assignment. When identifiers and evidence are linked, these records support one another. Whether a hand-over and acceptance actually took place is confirmed by the chain of custody evidence linked to the parties concerned and to the waste package.

In implementing a system, it is advisable to preserve the original chain of custody evidence together with the reason for any correction, the person who made it and the related supporting records. When repackaging creates a new waste package record, the link to the earlier record must be clearly maintained. These links allow reviewers to trace changes to containers and contents while preserving the earlier history.

When communication is delayed, the time an event occurred and the time the system received its record will differ. Both times should be preserved when designing audit records, so that late-arriving data can be placed in the correct chain of custody sequence. Sorting by receipt time alone can make custody appear to have passed in the reverse of the actual order.

4.8.1 API Security Provisions of WIA-ENE-026

This section is the reference section for security requirements throughout the book. Other chapters refer to it when security requirements are needed.

Section 10.2 of the WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 standard specifies API key authentication using X-API-Key, scope-based OAuth 2.0 authorization, mutual TLS for inter-facility communication and digital signatures for IAEA reporting. The security requirements include HTTPS/TLS 1.3, end-to-end encryption using AES-256-GCM, IP whitelisting for high-risk operations and retention of audit logs for 10 years. Rate limits are 500 requests per hour for authenticated access and 50 requests per hour for unauthenticated access.

A system should define OAuth scope names and grant access according to the operations and records each role requires. Signatures for IAEA reporting support the reporting workflow. Adding a transport chain of custody process that uses digital signatures requires the signers, the records signed and the verification rules to be specified in an implementation profile.

4.8.2 Preserving Evidence over the Long Term

When signed hand-over and acceptance is added to a system, the implementation profile should specify the signed content, encoding, signer roles, key validation and verification procedure. This allows the confirmations of the consignor and the consignee to be linked to the same waste package and event. Long-term verification also requires the archive to preserve the original signed data and the evidence supporting its trustworthiness at the relevant time. Confirming the authenticity and completeness of records spanning decades, and keeping them verifiable, requires this material in addition to the root certificate.

The 10-year retention requirement for API audit logs is separate from the retention periods needed for waste package histories and safety evidence. Facility acceptance, long-term storage and disposal records need records management policies suited to their function and applicable requirements. Such policies should address how records remain readable and how evidence of integrity is preserved even as systems and cryptographic methods change.

4.9 Standard Interfaces Supporting Transport Records

Interface paths in WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 are relative to the API base address. This book uses https://api.wiastandards.com/ene-026/v1 as an example base address. The actual service address and its availability are determined by the implementing organization, so they should be confirmed with that organization before integration. The table in this section summarizes how the standard interfaces are used in transport work; the complete set of definitions is collected in a single table in Section 2.8. The API covers waste packages, monitoring, dose calculation and facilities, and allows the related management records to be retrieved and exchanged within transport workflows.

Waste package list queries use facilityId, wasteClass, isotope, startDate, endDate, page and limit. For the relationship between broad wasteClass filters and the more detailed codes, see the code layer table in Section 1.3. A system's query conventions should specify how such broad filters are applied to the subcategories of waste packages.

Monitoring reading queries use sensorId, packageId, startTime, endTime and threshold. The severity values of GET /monitoring/alerts are info, warning, alarm and emergency, and the status values are active, acknowledged and resolved. These values classify the severity and handling status of monitoring alerts.

When additional operations are implemented for transport workflows, such as plan approval, package certification, updates to chain of custody entries, renewal of transport approvals, incident reporting and audit record retrieval, they should be documented as extensions. The documentation should specify the request structure, the authorization rules and the relationship of each operation to the WIA waste package record.

Recording an event and authorizing a movement are separate operations. Accurate factual records may be needed even for movements that are refused, suspended or cancelled. Operating procedures should preserve such histories together with the related authorization decisions.

4.9.1 Notifications and the Limits of Integration

The webhook event names defined by WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 are package.created, package.moved, monitoring.alarm, dose.exceeded, inspection.due and safeguards.report. These names identify the subject of a notification. A system receiving package.moved should check the related waste package record and operational status before taking any follow-up action, including the acceptance process at the receiving facility.

Integration conventions should specify the notification payload, delivery authentication, ordering, retry behaviour and the relationship between location updates and movement notifications. They should also explain how notifications are linked to the authoritative waste package record and how missing, delayed and duplicate notifications are handled. These implementation rules protect the inventory and the chain of custody from repeated or out-of-order processing.

4.10 Medical and Other Short-Lived Radioactive Waste

WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 includes medical radioisotope waste within the scope of its application to medical facilities. Medical facilities generate radioactive waste with widely varying activity, physical form and decay characteristics. Packages are selected according to these characteristics and the applicable conditions of transport. A medical origin or a short half-life is not enough on its own: the package type can be determined only when the characteristics of the actual contents are also assessed. Treating a disused sealed source as special form requires the relevant qualification evidence.

Records should distinguish the supply and use of medical radioactive material from the return of spent generators and disused sources. A Mo-99/Tc-99m generator is a device for separating the Tc-99m produced by the decay of Mo-99, which has a half-life of about 66 hours. Records should treat Mo-99 production, generator manufacture and radiopharmaceutical preparation as separate activities. Returning a spent generator requires characterization of the remaining radionuclides, activity and physical condition, and confirmation of the applicable conditions of transport. Temperature control requirements depend on the individual product or contents.

For short-lived radionuclides, the result of a transport assessment can vary considerably with the activity reference time, and the effect is greater when a shipment is delayed. For example, a single radionuclide for which no daughter contribution needs to be considered retains one quarter of its initial activity after two half-lives. This calculation reflects the change due to radioactive decay. Clearance, qualification as an excepted package and authorization of dispatch must each be assessed against their own conditions.

The WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 model records activity, units, radionuclide identification, half-life and the reference date for total activity. In the examples of the standard, referenceDate uses a date only. Where changes within a single day matter, the implementers of a system must agree on how the exact activity reference time is to be preserved. The top-level timestamp of a waste package record, the measurement time and the activity reference time should each be managed according to their distinct meanings.

Where the ingrowth of daughter radionuclides from the decay of a parent affects the inventory, this change must be taken into account in addition to a single exponential decay calculation. Generator assessments consider the decay of the parent and the ingrowth of the daughter together. The inputs to POST /dose/decay represent a calculation using the radionuclide, initial activity and elapsed time. The supporting assessment must confirm that this calculation can be applied to the inventory in question. Records should keep calculated activity, measured activity and the assumptions linking the two distinct.

4.11 Acceptance for Future Transfers and Disposal

Long-term planning must distinguish planned movements from completed transfers. For example, a hypothetical management route may pass through the generating facility, an interim storage facility and a disposal facility. The timing and feasibility of each transfer depend on the readiness of the facilities, the condition of the waste packages and the applicable approvals and acceptance criteria.

The regulatory.disposalPlan and storage.storageDuration fields of WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 record plans and durations. When a plan changes, the system should preserve the basis for significant changes and their relationship to the waste package records affected. Scheduled dates and disposal methods represent future plans; whether acceptance and disposal have been completed is confirmed by records of actual events.

Physical receipt and acceptance for storage or disposal are separate decisions. Even after confirming the arrival of a waste package, the receiving facility may continue to review its identification, condition, inventory and supporting documents. Acceptance criteria may include the waste form, radionuclide composition, condition of the packaging, thermal output and other facility-specific requirements. The transport approval and the acceptance by the receiving facility each require their own applicability review.

In a receipt review, the item can be identified by packageId and containerInfo.containerId, after which radiologicalData, physicalProperties and processing can be compared with the facility criteria. Comparing capacities requires matching physical quantities and units. The WIA facility example expresses capacity in m3, a unit of volume. A quantity of uranium expressed in tonnes is a mass, so comparing it with storage volume requires an appropriate physical basis.

After acceptance, the recorded storage location, facility inventory and chain of custody must match the actual emplacement and transfer of custody. If a discrepancy calls for further review, the confirmation of arrival and the acceptance decision must be managed separately. In implementing a system, it is advisable to define the order in which location, inventory and chain of custody records are updated and the recovery actions required if processing fails. When waste is later transferred onward from an interim storage facility, the existing history must be preserved and linked to the subsequent hand-over and acceptance and to the disposal evidence.

Characterization and chain of custody records preserve the origin, characteristics and transfer history of the waste needed for future disposal safety assessment. The disposal safety assessment and facility acceptance each use this evidence according to their own decision-making processes. For the criteria and guidance applicable at the disposal stage, see Section 1.10 and Chapter 3.

Chapter Summary

• Package types, waste management classes and security categories represent different characteristics and must be kept distinct in records. As of October 2026, the edition of SSR-6 in force is the 2025 Edition (Rev. 2).
• The activity limit for a Type A package allows activity up to and including the A1 or A2 value. The hypothetical example mixture gives 0.75 with the 2018 Edition values and 0.85 with the 2025 Edition values, both of which satisfy the mixture summation condition (sum ≤ 1). Suitability for Type A transport is judged by also assessing other requirements such as package performance, radiation levels and surface contamination.
• The normal-condition tests for Type A packages include the water spray test; the thermal test for Type B packages includes 30 minutes at a minimum of 800 °C; and the impact test for Type C packages requires at least 90 m/s.
• Assessment of fissile material packages requires a validated method, account of bias and uncertainty, and a subcritical margin. Applying burnup credit also requires fuel history data appropriate to the assessment.
• Waste package and container identifiers, chain of custody entries, approval metadata and supporting documents link dispatch, transport and receipt.
• The WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 interfaces exchange waste package, storage location, monitoring, calculation and facility records. Implementation conventions connect these operations to transport workflows and notifications.
• WIA-ENE-026 v1.0 specifies API security controls and 10-year retention of audit logs. Waste package histories and long-term safety evidence need retention policies suited to their continued use.
• Information that establishes the activity reference time and the currency of tracking data must be preserved, and parent–daughter effects must be taken into account. Planned movements, transfers of custody, physical arrival and facility acceptance must also be distinguished.

References

WIA Standards — WIA-ENE-026 — Chapter 4. Hongik Ingan (弘益人間) — Benefit All Humanity.