Radioactive Waste Management eBook — Chapter 4: Transport of Radioactive Materials

IAEA SSR-6 (2018 Edition) Type A/B/C packages, criticality safety per IAEA NSS-25-G, security per IAEA NSS-9 Rev 1, route surveillance per OECD/NEA Transport Working Group.

This chapter elaborates on the Transport of Radioactive Materials portion of Radioactive Waste Management (WIA-ENE-026). The radioactive waste management canonical envelope shape, API surface, and protocol exchanges are designed to interoperate across implementations published under the WIA Standards family. Each Phase file in `spec/` documents one architectural layer (envelopes, REST surface, federation, ecosystem) and the present chapter focuses on the transport of radioactive materials subset of that layering.

Implementations of transport of radioactive materials need to reconcile the per-standard expectations of IAEA GSG-1 (Classification of Radioactive Waste), IAEA SSR-5 (Disposal of Radioactive Waste), IAEA SSG-23 (Safety Case for Geological Disposal), IAEA Joint Convention on Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Safety, IAEA SSR-6 (Transport of Radioactive Material). The Phase 1 envelope class for Radioactive Waste Management carries the per-host identifier and per-tenant identifier so that audit records can be reconstructed across hosts that federate through the Phase 3 protocol layer.

Operators stepping into transport of radioactive materials typically follow this trajectory: stand up the reference simulator at `simulator/index.html`, walk the canonical envelope per the CLI helper at `cli/radioactive-waste.sh envelope`, then exercise the Phase 2 endpoints with curl/Postman against a host running the reference container at `wia/radioactive-waste-host:1.0.0`. Once those steps complete, integrators wire the real backend one endpoint at a time per the Phase 1 §A.* envelope catalogue and the Phase 2 §B.* endpoint catalogue.

A common operational concern in the transport of radioactive materials space is observability. Every Phase 1 envelope SHOULD emit a structured log line at the host's audit transport with: timestamp per RFC 3339, host identifier, tenant identifier, envelope class, envelope identifier, operation outcome, and a W3C Trace Context `traceparent` propagated end-to-end. Phase 2 surfaces this trace identifier as the `X-WIA-Trace-Id` response header. Phase 3 protocol exchanges propagate the trace identifier inside the exchange envelope so that a federation crossing remains correlatable end-to-end.

The transport of radioactive materials portion of the standard composes with: WIA-OMNI-API for credential storage, WIA-AIR-SHIELD for runtime trust list, WIA-INTENT for workload intent declaration, and WIA Secure Enclave for sealed-data envelopes where personal data is processed. The composition lets one host running multiple WIA family standards reuse one identity, one signing-key chain, and one audit transport rather than maintaining N parallel per-standard implementations.

Normative references touched in this chapter

Implementation worksheet

Cross-standard composition recap

This chapter, like every other Phase 1-4 chapter in the Radioactive Waste Management eBook, composes with the wider WIA Standards family. Implementations that adopt the canonical envelope reuse the cross-standard audit transport (W3C Trace Context plus OpenTelemetry semantic conventions), the cross-standard identity (WIA-OMNI-API), and the cross-standard runtime trust list (WIA-AIR-SHIELD) without per-standard re-implementation. The federation handshake described in Phase 3 §3 follows the same challenge-response pattern as the rest of the WIA Standards family so that one operator can federate across multiple standards using one signing-key chain and one audit transport.

4.1 IAEA SSR-6 (2018 edition) Type A/B/C Package Classification

IAEA Safety Standards Series SSR-6 "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material" (2018 edition) is the international standard regulatory document for transport of radioactive material. Since the first edition in 1961, SSR-6 has been revised 14 times. Korea adopts SSR-6 domestically as NSSC Notice 2021-3 ("Regulation on the Safe Transport of Radioisotopes etc."), applicable to all road, rail, marine, and air transport of radioactive material. SSR-6 classifies packages in five categories based on activity and potential hazard.

Excepted Package: Surface dose rate at most 5 microsievert per hour, and activity concentration within a fixed multiplier of the IAEA RS-G-1.7 exemption level. Eligible for general postal and courier shipment.
Industrial Package (IP-1, IP-2, IP-3): For Low Specific Activity (LSA) materials or Surface Contaminated Objects (SCO). IP-1 has the minimum requirements; IP-3 requires Type A equivalent normal-test compliance.
Type A Package: For radioactive material below the A1 (special form) or A2 (non-special form) activity threshold. Must pass normal-condition tests (0.3 to 1.2 m drop, 6 kg bar puncture, compression test, water immersion test) without loss of containment.
Type B(U) / Type B(M) Package: For activity above the A1 / A2 thresholds. Must pass not only the normal tests but also accident-condition tests (9 m drop, 1 m bar puncture, 800-degree fire for 30 minutes, 15 m water immersion). (U) means Unilateral approval; (M) means Multilateral approval. The Korean spent-fuel transport package KOREA NPS-1 is a Type B(U)F.
Type C Package: For high-activity material in air transport. Must pass not only the Type B accident tests but also the 200 m/s impact test simulating an aircraft accident.

4.2 A1 / A2 Activity Threshold Calculation

A1 is the Type-A maximum permitted activity for special-form material (non-dispersible solid or encapsulated). A2 is the threshold for non-special-form (dispersible) material. IAEA SSR-6 §401 and Table 2 list the per-nuclide A1 / A2 values. Representative values: Co-60 A1 = 0.4 TBq, A2 = 0.4 TBq; Cs-137 A1 = 2 TBq, A2 = 0.6 TBq; Pu-239 A1 = 10 TBq, A2 = 0.001 TBq (Pu-239 has a very low A2 because of high inhalation toxicity when dispersed). For multi-nuclide mixtures, the sum-of-fractions rule is applied to evaluate threshold compliance.

sum_i (a_i / A_2_i) ≤ 1   // condition for Type A package compliance

The reference simulator panel 4 (transport calculator) accepts a nuclide-and-activity array and returns the A1 / A2 fractions plus a recommendation of the qualifying package type.

4.3 IAEA NSS-25-G Criticality Safety

For fissile-material transport (uranium-235, plutonium-239, and others), preventing a criticality accident is the most important safety variable. IAEA Nuclear Security Series NSS-25-G "Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security" and SSR-6 §671 through §680 specify criticality-safety requirements for fissile-material packages. The key principles are: (1) under normal transport conditions, a single package k_eff at most 0.95 at 95 percent confidence; (2) for multi-package stacking, N-package stack k_eff at most 0.95; (3) under accident conditions (water ingress, geometric deformation), k_eff at most 0.95. Korea verifies these conditions with the KAERI KENO-VI criticality code and the MCNP6 Monte Carlo code.

4.3.1 Criticality Safety of Spent-Fuel Transport Packages

The KOREA NPS-1 package (designed by KEPCO E&C) maintains k_eff below 0.95 when loaded with 21 PWR assemblies by applying burnup credit. Burnup credit is the criticality-evaluation technique that accounts for the fact that spent fuel has partial depletion of fissile nuclides (U-235, Pu-239) and accumulation of neutron-absorber nuclides (Sm-149, Sm-151, Gd-155, Gd-157, Eu-153, Eu-155, Cs-133, Nd-143, Nd-145, Gd-155, and others) during reactor operation. The NRC ISG-8 Rev 3 "Burnup Credit for PWR Spent Fuel" guide is harmonized with Korean NSSC Notice 2021-3.

4.4 IAEA NSS-9 Rev 1 Security Requirements

IAEA Nuclear Security Series NSS-9 Rev 1 "Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material" (2020) specifies security requirements to prevent theft, malicious acts, and sabotage during transport of radioactive material. The security level differs by category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear material (based on uranium and plutonium quantities). Category 1 (spent fuel, or 5 kg or more of highly-enriched uranium) requires armed convoy, real-time GPS tracking, end-to-end encrypted communication, dual drivers, and immediate alarm if the convoy departs from the predefined corridor. In Korea, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control (KINAC) reviews and approves transport security plans by category.

4.5 OECD/NEA Route Monitoring

The OECD/NEA Transport Working Group (TWG) has collected and shared member-country transport data, accident statistics, and good practices since 1969. Route monitoring uses multi-redundant GPS, cellular, and satellite communication to transmit real-time position to the control center, with automatic alarm if the convoy departs from the predefined corridor. KORAD is a member of the NEA TWG; for spent-fuel and high-level waste transport, Korea draws on NEA TWG case studies to develop corridor plans.

4.6 Korean Transport Infrastructure Mapping

Regulator: NSSC certifies packages (Type B(U) / Type B(M) / Type C) and issues transport permits. KINS performs the technical review of package certification and on-site assessment in transport accidents. KINAC reviews transport security plans for category 1 / 2 nuclear material.
Generator and shipper: KHNP for spent-fuel inter-site transport (such as Kori to Hanul moves). KAERI for research isotope shipment. KIRAMS, the National Cancer Center, and MFDS-licensed medical facilities for medical isotope shipping and receipt.
Disposal receiver: KORAD receives at the Gyeongju disposal facility; will receive at the future centralized interim storage facility.
Transport infrastructure: Korea uses all four transport modes - road (expressways and national roads), rail (Korea Railroad Corporation - KORAIL), marine (KEPCO marine transport and private shipping companies), and air (Incheon Airport and Gimpo Airport cargo terminals). Spent fuel and other heavy shipments use marine mode preferentially.
Korean-type packages: KOREA NPS-1 (KEPCO E&C) for PWR 21-assembly transport - NSSC certification November 2022; KAERI KSRP-100 for research spent fuel - Type B(U), NSSC certification June 2019; medical Tc-99m generator transport - IP-3 package, multiple domestic manufacturers.
Statutes: Article 65 of the Nuclear Safety Act (transport permit), NSSC Notice 2021-3 ("Regulation on the Safe Transport of Radioisotopes etc."), the Dangerous Substances Safety Management Act (National Fire Agency, general transport), the Ship Safety Act (marine), and the Aviation Safety Act (air). Road and rail are also harmonized with the Trucking Transport Business Act and the Railway Safety Act respectively.
International conventions: Direct adoption of IAEA SSR-6. The IMDG Code (International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, IMO) Class 7 applies directly. UN ECE ADR (road dangerous-goods convention) Class 7 is harmonized. ICAO Technical Instructions (air dangerous-goods regulation) Class 7 is harmonized.
Accident response: Korea operates a dual system - NSSC central emergency response headquarters plus local-government emergency response headquarters. In a transport accident, the KINS rapid-response team dispatches within 30 minutes for environmental radiation measurement, isolation, and rescue support. Korea has recorded zero criticality / containment loss events in radioactive material transport since 1999, with 12 minor incidents (package deformation, vehicle contact) recorded by KINS RWMIS through 2025.

4.7 Transport Envelope Example

{
  "version": "1.0",
  "host_id": "khnp.kr.transport.dispatch",
  "tenant_id": "khnp.kori-unit-3",
  "envelope_class": "WIA-ENE-026.Transport.TypeBUF",
  "envelope_id": "ulid:01HK9XYZAB1234CD...",
  "package_certificate": "KR-NSSC-2022-B-U-F-NPS1",
  "package_serial": "KOREA-NPS-1-002",
  "contents": {
    "iaea_class": "HLW",
    "jurisdiction_class_korea": "high-level",
    "fuel_type": "PWR 17x17 WH-OFA",
    "assembly_count": 21,
    "total_uranium_kg": 9456,
    "average_burnup_mwd_per_tu": 45200
  },
  "criticality_safety": {
    "keff_normal": 0.873,
    "keff_accident": 0.918,
    "burnup_credit_applied": true,
    "credit_isotopes": ["U-234","U-235","U-236","U-238","Pu-238","Pu-239","Pu-240","Pu-241","Pu-242","Am-241","Sm-149","Sm-151"]
  },
  "route": {
    "origin": "kori-spent-fuel-pool-unit-3",
    "destination": "wolsong-macstor-interim",
    "mode": "marine",
    "carrier": "KEPCO Marine Co. Ltd.",
    "convoy_security": "category-1-armed-escort"
  },
  "audit": {
    "timestamp": "2026-05-15T14:11:22Z",
    "traceparent": "00-ab12cd34ef56789012345678abcdef00-3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d-01"
  }
}

4.8 Transport Audit-Chain Integration

The transport envelope integrates with the spent-fuel envelope's chain-of-custody (Chapter 2) and the disposal envelope's acceptance record (Chapter 3) by binding the package_serial and the envelope_id across all three envelopes. A single spent-fuel assembly may transit through 4 to 8 transport events over its 60- to 100-year lifetime (reactor discharge to SFP, SFP to dry cask, dry cask to interim storage, interim storage to final disposal), and the chain-of-custody field accumulates one entry per transport event signed by the carrier under the WIA Standards family's signature scheme (Ed25519 over canonical CBOR encoding). Korean NSSC RWMIS captures these custody entries through the Phase 2 endpoint POST /spent-fuel/transport-event, which is exposed by every accredited carrier endpoint.

4.9 Transport Phase 2 Endpoints

The Phase 2 REST surface for transport exposes six core endpoints. POST /transport/package-certify registers a Type A, Type B(U), Type B(M), or Type C package certificate, capturing the issuing regulator (typically NSSC for Korea) and the certificate validity period. POST /transport/plan creates a transport plan with origin, destination, mode, carrier, package serial(s), and security category. POST /transport/event records actual transport events including departure, transit-checkpoint pass, and arrival, each signed by the carrier. GET /transport/route returns the predefined corridor for a plan with deviation alerting thresholds. POST /transport/incident records minor and major incidents (package deformation, vehicle accident, route deviation, security breach). GET /transport/audit returns the full transport audit chain for a given plan or package serial.

All transport endpoints integrate with the IAEA SSR-6 package certification chain and the IAEA NSS-9 security category. The security_category field in the transport-plan body is one of "category-1", "category-2", "category-3", or "below-category". Category-1 plans require the security plan to be submitted to the regulator (KINAC in Korea) and approved before any transport event is recorded.

4.10 Transport Audit Composition with Disposal Acceptance

The transport envelope composes with the disposal-acceptance envelope (Chapter 3) at the moment of arrival. The arrival event signed by the carrier is paired with an acceptance signature from the receiver (KORAD-1 silo04 for an LLW drum, the future centralized interim storage facility for spent fuel). The dual signature is recorded as the final entry in the chain-of-custody field of the spent-fuel envelope, completing the from-generator-to-disposer audit chain. For spent fuel intended for permanent disposal (post-2060), an additional acceptance entry will be appended at the permanent disposal facility, with the chain-of-custody field then containing 8 to 12 entries spanning 60 to 100 years and 4 to 6 distinct sites.

This cross-envelope composition is the key value proposition of the WIA-ENE-026 standard: by embedding the audit chain in canonical envelopes signed at every custody transfer, the standard makes the multi-decade audit trail independently verifiable by any party with access to the WIA root certificate, including the IAEA Joint Convention review process, NSSC inspectors, and academic researchers. Without this cross-envelope composition, a multi-decade audit trail would depend on the continued operational existence of bespoke per-facility databases, which is a fragile assumption over 60-to-100-year timescales.