Chapter 2: Condition Monitoring per ISO 17359

Robot Maintenance — WIA-ROBOT-MAINT-001

ISO 17359:2018 condition monitoring + diagnostics flowchart, parameter selection (vibration / temperature / oil analysis / acoustic emission / motor current signature analysis), data acquisition envelope.

This chapter elaborates on the Condition Monitoring per ISO 17359 portion of Robot Maintenance (WIA-ROBOT-MAINT-001). The robot maintenance canonical envelope shape, API surface, and protocol exchanges are designed to interoperate across implementations published under the WIA Standards family. Each Phase file in `spec/` documents one architectural layer (envelopes, REST surface, federation, ecosystem) and the present chapter focuses on the condition monitoring per iso 17359 subset of that layering.

Implementations of condition monitoring per iso 17359 need to reconcile the per-standard expectations of ISO 17359:2018 (Condition monitoring + diagnostics), ISO 13373 series (Vibration monitoring), ISO 18436 series (Personnel competence), ISO 10816 / ISO 20816 (Vibration severity), IEC 60300-3-11 (RCM). The Phase 1 envelope class for Robot Maintenance carries the per-host identifier and per-tenant identifier so that audit records can be reconstructed across hosts that federate through the Phase 3 protocol layer.

Operators stepping into condition monitoring per iso 17359 typically follow this trajectory: stand up the reference simulator at `simulator/index.html`, walk the canonical envelope per the CLI helper at `cli/robot-maintenance.sh envelope`, then exercise the Phase 2 endpoints with curl/Postman against a host running the reference container at `wia/robot-maintenance-host:1.0.0`. Once those steps complete, integrators wire the real backend one endpoint at a time per the Phase 1 §A.* envelope catalogue and the Phase 2 §B.* endpoint catalogue.

A common operational concern in the condition monitoring per iso 17359 space is observability. Every Phase 1 envelope SHOULD emit a structured log line at the host's audit transport with: timestamp per RFC 3339, host identifier, tenant identifier, envelope class, envelope identifier, operation outcome, and a W3C Trace Context `traceparent` propagated end-to-end. Phase 2 surfaces this trace identifier as the `X-WIA-Trace-Id` response header. Phase 3 protocol exchanges propagate the trace identifier inside the exchange envelope so that a federation crossing remains correlatable end-to-end.

The condition monitoring per iso 17359 portion of the standard composes with: WIA-OMNI-API for credential storage, WIA-AIR-SHIELD for runtime trust list, WIA-INTENT for workload intent declaration, and WIA Secure Enclave for sealed-data envelopes where personal data is processed. The composition lets one host running multiple WIA family standards reuse one identity, one signing-key chain, and one audit transport rather than maintaining N parallel per-standard implementations.

Normative references touched in this chapter

Implementation worksheet

  1. Read the corresponding Phase file in spec/ (Phase 1 for envelopes, Phase 2 for API, Phase 3 for protocol, Phase 4 for ecosystem).
  2. Walk the CLI helper: ./cli/robot-maintenance.sh envelope emits a sample Phase 1 envelope.
  3. Exercise the simulator at simulator/index.html.
  4. Cross-reference the standards listed above to align with the operator's per-jurisdiction obligations.
  5. Wire the conformance suite at https://github.com/WIA-Official/wia-robot-maintenance-conformance.

Cross-standard composition recap

This chapter, like every other Phase 1-4 chapter in the Robot Maintenance eBook, composes with the wider WIA Standards family. Implementations that adopt the canonical envelope reuse the cross-standard audit transport (W3C Trace Context plus OpenTelemetry semantic conventions), the cross-standard identity (WIA-OMNI-API), and the cross-standard runtime trust list (WIA-AIR-SHIELD) without per-standard re-implementation. The federation handshake described in Phase 3 §3 follows the same challenge-response pattern as the rest of the WIA Standards family so that one operator can federate across multiple standards using one signing-key chain and one audit transport.